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Abstract
This Master thesis starts by reviewing a wide strand of the literature about
the linkage between growth and inequality. It then proposes an overlapping
generation model with altruistic agents that are heterogeneous in ability and
initial wealth. They go through a two-stage education process, during which
the decision of investing in higher education is left to them. Possibility for
borrowers to evade debt payments imposes a constraint on credit which will
impact human capital accumulation. Quality of the two educational sec-
tors (basic and advanced) depends on public funding which is allocated to
each sector. We analyze the impact of initial distribution of wealth on the
subsequent achievements of the economy as well as the possible policy rec-
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The linkage between growth and inequality has become a major point of
interest for economists with a wide field for policy recommendations, all
the more since the human capital literature as well as the one on the eco-
nomics of education has entered the debate. The crucial question is to know
whether inequality in the distribution of wealth spurs or slows down eco-
nomic growth. While it was thought that inequalities, allowing to channel
resources towards high saving agents, were impacting positively on growth
in a setup of strictly physical accumulation, another thesis has appeared
with the integration of human capital accumulation. Indeed, building on
the evidence that education of children was somehow positively correlated
to the parents’ income, many authors have focused on the idea that human
capital accumulation was curbed by the fact that low-income households
were constrained in their education investment by an imperfect credit mar-
ket. The result is that, more equality in the distribution of initial wealth
allowing to overcome the credit constraint, human capital is accumulated
faster and more efficiently in societies that start off with a more equal dis-
tribution of wealth and, therefore, these societies achieve higher levels of
long-run growth. This result implies important policy recommendations in-
sofar as public funding of education can be a tool in order to ease the credit
constraint.
Once this is observed, it is natural to wonder how educational investment
exactly is constrained. Indeed, in many countries, primary education is
free and often mandatory. It appears then that the constraint weighs on
the higher education investment, when tuition fee and opportunity cost of
working instead of studying become really significant. Hence the idea of
separating basic and advanced education came through, all the more than
the way to allocate public funding between the two sectors represents a
serious policy concern. A rationale for public funding of education often
found in developing countries is to create an efficient advanced education
sector able to train highly skilled agents who will fill high-ranking positions
in the government, public agencies and private companies from the coun-
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try. This view is based on the so-called trickle down effect, which argues
that developing countries lack efficient governing bodies and that, therefore,
investing in the training of an elite will benefit to the rest of the society.
An alternative view consists in saying that reallocating resources from basic
to advanced education worsens the quality of basic education, which will
impact negatively enrollment in higher education and thus will curb human
capital accumulation (we will say: the occupational effect).
After a review of the major strands of the literature on inequality and
growth, we will construct a three-period life overlapping generation model
with agents characterized by altruism, as they derive utility from bequeath-
ing, randomly assigned abilities, which correspond to a capacity to study
efficiently, and an initial endowment, received as a bequest. The credit mar-
ket is imperfect and education is a two-stage process whose quality depends
on the allocation for the two sectors. We show that economic achievements
are correlated to the initial distribution of wealth and that a more equal
distribution is more likely to allow higher levels of growth. Furthermore,
we will try to disentangle trickle-down and occupational effects when the
government reallocates resources from basic to higher education.
2 Literature review
A very abundant literature has examined the linkage between inequality
and growth. Usually building on the empirical evidence that there exists a
correlation between inequality in the distribution of wealth within a society
and the levels of growth achieved by this economy (it is shown that slowly
growing countries exhibit higher inequality levels), this literature does away
with the old conjecture according to which inequality would allow higher
overall saving rates and thus would spur economic growth. On the contrary,
many papers show that, once integrated human capital as a determinant of
economic growth, wealth inequalities can beget inefficiencies in educational
investments due to the existence of a credit constraint. For instance, starting
from the evidence of a positive correlation between an individual’s income
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and his parents’, Loury (1981) states that, in a family based economy char-
acterized by intergenerational altruism (modeled via a bequeathing process
that will determine the investment in training of the children) where there
does not exist possibilities of interfamily loans or income risk-sharing insur-
ance, there is room for public intervention to outperform the laissez-faire
outcome. Loury (1981) assumes that the distribution of abilities in the so-
ciety is random allowing for highly able children to be born in low-income
families where their access to training will be constrained due to a credit
market failure. In such a setup, Loury (1981) shows that redistributive
taxation is desirable insofar as it allows to achieve a long-run earnings dis-
tribution with both higher mean and lower variance than in the laissez-faire
outcome. In Loury (1981)’s setup, desirability of an outcome is based on
a trade-off between inequality and social mobility captured by the indirect
utility function. This way, no use is made of a social welfare function but
desirability is rather measured on an individualistic basis. The intuition of
the result is then that an egalitarian redistributive taxation system allows
somehow an income risk-sharing process. Indeed parents do not know the
ability of their offsprings when they decide of the education investment.
Redistributive taxation allows to reduce the risk of this investment, which
is welfare enhancing insofar as parents are risk-averse. The result accord-
ing to Loury (1981) is that we obtain a Rawlsian definition of a desirable
outcome as it consists in placing oneself behind a kind of veil of ignorance
(nobody knows what one’s offspring position in the society will be) to decide
of the best policy to implement. Loury (1981) however underlines that the
randomly attributed abilities represent quite a strong assumption. Indeed,
although there is no consensus on the ability transmission process, it cannot
be denied that there exists some persistence of abilities within a dynasty
due to education and gene transmission, which the model totally does not
account for.
Building on the same ground but modeling differently the credit market
imperfection (infinite interest rate in Loury (1981) versus monitoring costs
here) as well as the ordering of the outcomes, a major paper in this liter-
ature was written by Galor & Zeira (1993). The conclusions are globally
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the same but the setup is quite different. Individuals are still guided by
altruism but the credit market, instead of being merely inexistent, exhibits
an imperfection in the sense that individual borrowers can default and es-
cape reimbursement. This leads lenders to charge higher interest rates than
in a perfect market equilibrium in order to cover the monitoring and de-
fault costs. Added to this, a crucial assumption is the non-convexity of the
educational investment decision. Indeed, individuals only choose whether
to invest or not in human capital (indivisibility of the investment) and it
decides of their type: skilled or unskilled. These two types then access
two different technologies (only unskilled labour-based or skilled labour and
physical capital combined) that will pay different salaries, obviously higher
for the skilled. Under such a setup, Galor & Zeira (1993) show that there
exists a bequest threshold under which it is preferable for the agent not to
invest in human capital and work as an unskilled because borrowing to fi-
nance the educational investment would be too costly. Under this threshold,
dynasties will converge to an unskilled low wage long-run situation, whereas
above it, dynasties will reach a skilled high wage equilibrium. Economies
with same preferences and technologies can thus converge towards different
equilibria as soon as initial wealth is not distributed the same way. What
consequently decides of long-run growth and distribution of wealth will be
initial endowments. For a given level of aggregate initial wealth, a society
with a larger middle class may achieve a higher long-run growth and a more
equal distribution than one that starts with only a few well-off. This idea
generalizes to the situation where skills are randomly attributed to every in-
dividual. There will be an ability threshold added to the bequest threshold
that will prevent too poorly able individuals to invest in human capital and
will allow highly able individuals to have a lower bequest threshold. Still, the
same conclusion prevails concerning social mobility, except that there will
exist an area where upward and downward mobility will take place, without
changing the general results. In all cases, we obtain the same results as in
Loury (1981) that initial distribution of wealth has an effect on long-run
growth and distribution of earnings and that initial inequality impacts neg-
atively as the credit constraint prevents some potentially able individuals to
8
borrow and invest in human capital.
Moav (2002) further extends this model by replacing the non-convexity of
the educational investment by a convex saving function. This extension
builds on the empirical evidence that saving behaviours (here the bequeath-
ing process) generally exhibit a convex shape. Moav shows that such a
bequest function combined with the same credit market imperfection as in
Galor & Zeira (1993) is enough to ensure the result that dynasties that
are originally poor converge to a poor long-run equilibrium while originally
rich dynasties stay rich forever. In this setup again, inequality has a neg-
ative impact on long-run growth, at least as long as the initial proportion
of families that are below the saving threshold is not too high (so relatively
rich families). Indeed, in poor economies, it may happen that inequality
has some positive impact on aggregate savings and consequently on output,
although not on income. We find back the conjecture quoted earlier ac-
cording to which inequality spurs economic development via higher overall
saving rates. The Kuznets conjecture reconciles these two points of view: it
states that the linkage between inequality and growth depends on the stage
the economy is in. Formally, less developed countries exhibit high inequality
levels but this features fades away as the economy becomes more developed.
Galor & Moav (2004) have built a model in order to illustrate this conjecture.
In their model, the prime engine of growth in less developed economies is
physical capital accumulation. At this stage, inequality impacts positively
economic development by channeling wealth towards individuals with the
highest saving rates. Nevertheless, return to human capital capital tends
to increase due to skill-capital complementarity and therefore human capi-
tal accumulation becomes the prime engine of economic growth in so called
developed economies. Once it is the case and in presence of a credit mar-
ket imperfection, it has already been shown that equality spurs economic
growth because it allows more individuals to invest in education and become
skilled.
Another strand of the literature has focused rather on the correlation be-
tween parent and child occupation and income. This literature builds on
the empirical evidence according to which the credit constraint in the US is
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not binding and that other factors would explain inequalities in the educa-
tion investment of children coming from different backgrounds. Authors like
Heckman insist on the fact that skill formation is a life-long process and par-
ticularly on the demonstrated importance of the parents’ human capital level
as well as early investment in human capital of the children rather than on
the credit market imperfection affecting the higher education investment de-
cision. Indeed, Heckman (e.g. Carneiro, Cunha & Heckman 2003) mentions
two fundamental features of the skill formation process: first, the malleabil-
ity at early stages, meaning that the parents’ human capital level as well as
early investment are crucial for the child’s development; second, the comple-
mentarity of the human capital investments, meaning that early investment
that is not followed by investment in higher education or professional train-
ing is not productive and that any lack at the early stage will be extremely
costly to catch up later. The idea of randomly assigned abilities is kept but
is given much less importance as many other parameters play a role. The
result is that the credit constraint is not any more the critical determinant
of persisting inequalities and low growth levels. Indeed, as demonstrated in
studies of college attendance in the US, the credit constraint is not binding
for a great majority of students. Heckman rather blames what he calls a
”failure on the parents’ market”, namely the fact that children cannot buy
their parents and thus fully decide of their human capital investment.
An interesting attempt to reconcile these strands of the literature but in
a quite peculiar setup is due to Lloyd-Ellis (2000). Indeed, Lloyd-Ellis is
as well interested in drawing recommendations for policy makers regarding
the growth-inequality relationship but, rather than studying the impact of
a credit constraint, he designs a dual labour sector and a peculiar schooling
system that will exhibit a non-convexity. In fact, every individual is ran-
domly assigned an ability level, receives a bequest from his parents and basic
education from the State, whose quality depends on the level of public spend-
ing in this sector. From there, individuals chooses whether to go on with
further studies and therefore invest in higher education (whose quality de-
pends on State funding) or rather directly start working. The non-convexity
appears because the investment in higher education is discrete (choice of in-
10
vesting or not). Two kinds of workers offer their services: employees, whose
wage depends on the overall productivity (for which the human capital of all
workers counts) and managers, who get paid according to their own individ-
ual characteristics. There consequently exists a wedge between private and
social return to schooling for certain workers. This model exhibits a negative
correlation between inequality and growth. Indeed, a mean-preserving re-
duction in income dispersion will raise the average efficiency of the parental
investment in the children schooling (due to decreasing marginal returns of
parental inputs), this is the so-called productivity effect. It will as well raise
the fraction of low wage children entering higher education, impacting posi-
tively the supply of skilled workers and consequently aggregate output (the
occupational effect). This setup allows to evaluate the effect of reallocations
of State funding across basic and higher education. Reallocating towards
higher education, which is often done in developing countries based on the
argument that it will allow to fill governing positions efficiently and thus
enhance overall productivity (the trickle down effect), will in fact reduce
quality of basic education and consequently exclude agents with relatively
low human capital potential from entering higher education. It will increase
inequality which is a burden on growth in this model. Here, we find again
the idea of Heckman according to which a low early stage investment is too
costly to be caught up later on and that, at the same time, early investment




We consider an overlapping generation model. Agents in this economy are
heterogeneous as they differ in their initial wealth and in their level of ability.
Abilities in this model amount to a capacity for an agent to benefit efficiently
from education. The level of ability is randomly assigned to each agent for
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her entire life and is noted a ∈ [a; ā], with g(a) being the density function1.
The second heterogeneity amongst agents stems from the initial wealth they
receive in their first period of life as a bequest from their parent. Bequest




, with ft(bt) being the density and the
subscript t being the index for periods.
Agents live for three periods. The first one is dedicated to mandatory basic
education while the second one offers a choice between going on with further
studies (we will use the term: higher education) or working right away. In
the third one, everybody works, consumes and bequeaths. Each agent in
its third period, that we will call parent, is assigned a newly born agent,
that we will call child, and to whom she will leave a bequest. Agents are
thus considered to be altruistic as they derive utility from bequeathing. The
utility function takes the following form:
Ut = (1− ρ) log Ct + ρ log bt+1 (1)
Where Ct is the consumption of agents in their third stage in period t and
bt+1 is the parent’s bequest to her child also in period t. ρ represents the
altruism coefficient.
The succession of parents and children will be called a dynasty. Notice that,
this way, there is no population growth.
The accumulation of human capital via education is divided into two stages
and is therefore a sequential process. It might be the case that the ability
level of an agent is so low that human capital accumulated after the first
period is not enough to make investment in higher education worthwhile.
Such an agent thus prefers to work right away and we will call her ”unskilled
worker”. It might as well be the case that the agent initial wealth is not
enough to cover the higher education private cost (noted φ). By private cost,
we mean mainly the tuition fee plus as well the cost of living of the second
1It is true that randomly assigned abilities might be considered to be a strong as-
sumption as one cannot deny that there exists some kind of ability transmission process
from parents to offsprings both via genes and education. Nevertheless, the features of this
process are still largely disputed and not strongly ascertained, that is why we stick to the
random assignment here. We will comment further on that in the extension section
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period, cost that is not an obstacle for unskilled workers (because they work
in second period) but which must be covered by initial wealth or borrowed
for agents that wish to enter higher education. If neither ability nor initial
wealth is a problem, agents invest in higher education, accumulate further
human capital and work in their last period of life as ”skilled” workers.
How much human capital they accumulate will depend on the agent’s ability,
on whether she enters higher education and on public spending in the basic
and higher education sectors. We will note hBt and hAt the level of human
capital of an agent with ability a respectively after basic and advanced
education. The formal relationship is the following:{
hBt = aEαBt α ∈ [0; 1]
hAt = hBtE
β
At β ∈ [0; 1]
(2)
where EBt and EAt represent the quality of respectively basic and advanced
education proxied by the quantity of public funding invested in each sector.
3.1.2 The government
As seen previously while exposing the human capital accumulation process,
the government plays a crucial role in that it decides of the quality of the
two educational sectors by allocating resources among them. Another crucial
step is to decide of the taxation rate τ that will give the total amount of
public funding to spend on education. For this decision, the government has
the following budget constraint:
EBt + EAt = τYt−1 (3)
Where Yt−1 is the aggregate production in period t1 (and therefore the
aggregate income as well).
Then, considering that eB is the share that the government dedicates to
basic education (we will leave this share constant), we have the following
relationships:
EBt = eBτYt−1 (4)
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EAt = (1− eB)τYt−1 (5)
3.1.3 The credit market
We consider that the credit market is imperfect for agents2 in the sense of
Galor & Zeira (1993). Agents in this setup have the possibility of evading
repayments by hiding or fleeing but it is costly to them. In order to avoid
defaults, lenders can keep track of their borrowers but at a cost that will
impact the interest rate for agents. We assume that it is less costly for
lenders to keep track of the borrowers than it is for borrowers to evade debt
payment. It results that a credit market will exist but that the interest rate
for agents, noted i, will be higher than the worldwide interest rate, noted
r (we take the case of a small open economy, where the worldwide interest
rate prevails).
Together with the non-convexity in the educational investment (indivisible
investment), the credit market imperfection is crucial for the results here
to hold. The idea is that it may happen that highly able agents born to
a poor family choose not to enter advanced education, which represents an
inefficiency.
3.1.4 The production side
We assume that the economy only produces one good thanks to a Cobb-
Douglas technology combining physical and human capital. The production





t γ ∈ [0; 1] (6)
Where A is the total factor productivity, Kt and Ht are respectively the
stocks of physical and human capital in period t.
We define Ht as the integral of the individual human capital stock over the
whole working population, both skilled and unskilled. As we are in a small
open economy, firms can rent physical capital at the world interest rate r.
2Firms do not suffer from the credit constraint
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Hence, assuming perfect competition, both factors will be paid their mar-
ginal productivity. We therefore have the following regarding the relation-
ship between worldwide interest rate and the derivative of the production
function with respect to Kt:










Which is a constant.
As the human capital stock is known one period in advance (because it
results of investment decisions that take place at the end of the previous
period), firms can adjust perfectly their demand of physical capital in order
to keep the physical to human capital ratio unchanged. Taking the derivative
of the production function with respect to Ht now gives us an expression for
the remuneration of a unit of human capital:
FHt = w = (1− γ)A(KtHt )
γ




We can see from there that remuneration depends on how much human
capital one can offer. We can therefore deduce that unskilled and skilled
workers will have two different wage functions insofar as they do not have
the same amount of human capital to offer. But not only will the wage
function depend on the type of education an agent chose but as well it will
be directly correlated to the ability level of the agent. Let us derive the
explicit wage functions:





Where wu and ws are respectively the wage functions for unskilled and
skilled workers.
As we can see from these expressions, there exist two types of wage function
and consequently a continuum of wages with a jump while reaching an ability
level enough to enter advanced education.
3.2 Optimal behaviour
Let us consider an individual with ability a ∈ [a; ā] and bequest received
from her parent bt. This individual decides of her consumption Ct and
of her bequest to her offspring bt+1 under the constraint that it does not
overwhelm total wealth, that we will note Wt. Total wealth depends on the
second stage decision: either one has not entered advanced education and
thus has lent her whole bequest, worked right away as an unskilled and for
the two last periods, either one has entered advanced education and needed
to borrow to do so, she will then work as a skilled in the last period while
repaying her loan, either finally one has entered advanced education and
could pay the private cost from the bequest, in which case she has lent the
rest of the money and works as a skilled in the last period while being repaid
her loan. The individual’s maximization problem can be stated as follows:
maxCt,bt+1 Ut = (1− ρ) log Ct + ρ log bt+1
s.t. Wt = Ct + bt+1
(12)
Deriving the first order conditions, it is not hard to obtain the following:
Ct = (1− ρ)Wt (13)
bt+1 = ρWt (14)
As already explained earlier, total wealth Wt depends on second stage deci-
sions and we can distinguish between three situations:
1. The agent has not entered advanced education, has lent the full be-
quest and has worked during the two last periods as an unskilled. Here
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is the expression W ut for total wealth in this case:
W ut = (1 + r)
2bt + (1− τ)(2 + r)wu (15)
2. The agent has entered advanced education but has borrowed in order
to pay the private cost φ, she then pays back her loan as she works as
a skilled in the last period. This is an expression for W bt (total wealth
of borrowers):
W bt = (1 + i)((1 + r)bt − φ) + (1− τ)ws (16)
3. The agent has entered advanced education and had enough money
from the bequest to pay the full private cost φ right away. She could
thus lend what was left and get debt payments in addition to her
skilled wage during the last period. Here comes the expression for W rt
(total wealth of rich individuals):
W rt = (1 + r)((1 + r)bt − φ) + (1− τ)ws (17)
From this set of expressions, we can deduce conditions on the parameters
that will govern the second stage decisions of the agents. Indeed, we can
draw from equations (15) and (16) that borrowers will decide to invest in
higher education if the utility they derive from it is higher than from the un-
skilled situation, and this is the case whenever W bt > W
u
t . Let us rewrite this
condition to obtain an initial wealth threshold b∗t (a) under which individuals
choose not to invest:
b∗t (a) =
(1 + i)φ− (1− τ)waEαBt[E
β
At − (2 + r)]
(1 + r)(1 + i)
(18)
It is straightforward from the formula to see that this threshold increases
with the advanced education private cost φ. We can even add that it goes
down as the agent’s ability rises and as total public expenditures increases
provided we make the following assumption, for any given agent with ability
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a:
(2 + r)wut < w
s
t (19)
Which means that any agent would earn more working one period as a skilled
rather than two period as an unskilled.
From equations (15) and (17), we can compute an ability level a∗ under
which lenders choose not to invest in advanced education. They choose so
because utility being an unskilled is higher than the one derived from becom-
ing skilled. This happens whenever W ut > W
r
t . Rewriting this inequality,





At − (2 + r)]
(20)
From the thresholds expressed in (18) and (20), we can deduce the fraction






ft(bt) g(a) dbtda (21)
We can deduce from this expression that the size of the skilled population
depends on the distribution of individual abilities and on the distribution of
initial wealth.
3.3 Intergenerational mobility
3.3.1 The rise and fall of dynasties
3
In the previous section, we have derived the short-run optimization re-
sults. In this section, we focus on the dynamics of intergenerational mobility
and on its long-run implications. As seen in the previous section, the dis-
tribution of total wealth in period t depends on the distribution of abilities
as well as on the distribution of initial wealth (that is of the bequests left
3as labeled by Becker & Tomes (1986)
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by the previous generation). We can therefore deduce a dynamic system of
equations giving bt+1 in function of bt and a.
bt+1 =

ρ((1− τ)(2 + r)wu(a) + bt(1 + r)2) if bt < b∗t or a < a∗
ρ((1− τ)ws(a) + (1 + i)(bt(1 + r)− φ)) if b∗t ≤ bt <
φ
1+r and a ≥ a
∗
ρ((1− τ)ws(a) + (1 + r)(bt(1 + r)− φ)) if bt ≥ φ1+r and a ≥ a
∗
(22)
Where b0 is exogenously given.
Thus defined in (22), we have a Markov process giving bt+1 in function of
bt conditionally on the ability. We can see that, below the threshold a∗,
bt+1 in function of bt is an affine transformation with a small coefficient
ρ(1+ r)2 whereas, above this threshold, bt+1 in function of bt exhibits kinks.
For those born poor (that is with bt < φ1+r , meaning that they need to
borrow if they want to enter advanced education), we have to distinguish
between those who will remain unskilled and those who will borrow to get
advanced education. For the latter, the coefficient will be ρ(1 + r)2 as well
while, for the former, it will be ρ(1 + i)(1 + r) which is bigger (as i > r
by assumption). Here we observe a kind of leverage process for those who
can borrow: it is costly but the returns are worth it. Finally, for those born
rich (that is with bt ≥ φ1+r , meaning that they can afford the private cost of
advanced education without borrowing), the coefficient is back at ρ(1 + r)2.
Hence, if we want to picture this conditional Markov process, we have a
continuum of parallel straight lines with coefficient ρ(1 + r)2 for individuals
whose ability ranges from a to a∗ and, starting from a∗, we have parallel lines
but exhibiting two kinks: one in b∗t and another one in
φ
1+r . The coefficient
outside these boundaries is ρ(1 + r)2 as well and it is ρ(1 + i)(1 + r) on the
inside.
In order to derive some stability results, we need two further assumptions,
which follow:
ρ(1 + r)2 < 1 (23)
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ρ(1 + i)(1 + r) > 1 (24)
The first restriction prevents bequests from growing indefinitely whereas the
second one implies that the credit constraint is significant, that is that the
cost of keeping track of the borrowers is high enough to have a significant
spread between the world interest rate and the one applied to agents.
Once stated these restrictions, we can focus on the some stable points that
the Markovian system exhibits. By this, we mean the points that are left
unchanged by the bequeathing process, that is that individuals bequeath
exactly the same amount they were bequeathed. We can calculate these
points setting: bt+1 = bt, which will give us three functions of a.
• Let us take the case of agents with abilities ranging from a to a∗. We
have a unique function of a bB(a)a<a∗ that verifies bt+1 = bt, it takes
the following form:
bB(a) =
ρ(1− τ)(2 + r)waEαBt
1− ρ(1 + r)2
(25)
As (1 + r)2 < 1, we can infer that individuals that were endowed with
a bequest smaller than bB(a) will bequeath more and, on the contrary,
those who had more will bequeath less. We can even say that, for
dynasties of families with abilities below a∗, the bequeathing process
will converge towards the continuum of long-run values given by bB(a).
• We now turn to the case when abilities range from a∗ to ā. Given
the properties that we exposed earlier about the relationship between
bt+1 and bt in this case and given the restrictions (23) and (24), we
will have three functions of a that will leave the bequests unchanged




1+r , and one bigger than
φ
1+r .
The first one takes the same form as bB(a) in (25).
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The second one is as follows:
k∗(a) =
ρ[(1− τ)w a EαBt E
β
At − (1 + i)φ]
1− ρ(1 + r)(1 + i)
(26)
Finally, the last one is given by:
bA(a) =
ρ[(1− τ)w a EαBt E
β
At − (1 + r)φ]
1− ρ(1 + r)2
(27)
It is again quite simple to infer the dynamics of such a process: hav-
ing received a bequest below bB(a), an individual will bequeath more;
for a bequest between bB(a) and k∗(a), an individual would bequeath
less; inversely if the bequest received is between k∗(a) and bA(a); fi-
nally, an individual with initial bequest above bA(a) will bequeath
more. Therefore we can say that dynasties starting off with less than
k∗(a) will converge towards the continuum of long-run values given
by bB(a). Those starting with more than k∗(a) will converge towards
the set of long-run values given by bA(a) provided abilities stay above
a∗. Here we would like to emphasize that there will exist individu-
als that enter advanced education but will bequeath less than what
they received so that one offspring at some point will drop advanced
education and thus will end up in a poor dynasty, namely they are
those who received a bequest between b∗t and k
∗(a). On the other
hand, individuals born poor (less than φ1+r ) but who received though
more than k∗(a) will enter as well advanced education and bequeath
more than what they received allowing their offsprings to become rich
(bA(a) > φ1+r ) provided they keep abilities higher than a
∗.
To sum up this process, we can say that the society is divided in two classes:
skilled and unskilled. Whether one belongs to one or the other depends on
the distributions of abilities and initial wealth. While those born with less
than k∗(a) are sure that the dynasty of their offsprings will finally converge
towards poor long-run values and an unskilled situation, those born with
more than k∗(a) have pretty good chances to see their dynasties converge
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towards the high long-run values and a skilled situation provided all the
successive offsprings maintain at least an ability equal to a∗.
3.3.2 Interclass mobility across generations
We mean by interclass mobility across generations the fact that dynasties
may change class over generations depending on their successive levels of
ability and initial wealth. We observe two kinds of mobility: upward and
downward. The latter concerns dynasties that start off poor (less than
φ
1+r ) and though manage to become rich through investment in advanced
education. The only way to succeed is to have ability levels that stay over
a∗ and at the same time an initial wealth above k∗(a). As regards the
former, it concerns on the contrary dynasties that start off rich and fall into
poverty. For that to happen, it must be the case that at some point in the
dynasty an individual is endowed with an ability below a∗ so that she does
not invest into advanced education, bequeath to her offspring less than what
she received and possibly less that k∗(a).







• Prob(r/r) gives the probability that agents born to rich parents remain
rich. Being born rich, they necessarily have more than φ1+r (> k
∗(a∗)),
they therefore only need to have an ability level above a∗ to remain
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ft(bt) g(a) dbtda (28)
• Prob(p/r) gives the probability that agents born to rich parents be-
come poor. For this, it suffices that a rich agent gets an ability endow-
ment lower than a∗, provided that we make the following assumption:
ρ((1− τ)(2 + r)wu(a∗) + b̄(1 + r)2) < φ
1 + r
(29)
This assumption makes sure that even the richest individual, if of
type a∗ or less, will end up poor. We will call this process downward







ft(bt) g(a) dbtda (30)
• Prob(r/p) gives the probability that agents born to poor parents be-
come rich. To compute this probability, we need to find the bequest
threshold j∗(a∗) lying in between k∗(a∗) and φ1+r above which individ-
uals with ability of a∗ and more will bequeath at least φ1+r . Here is
what j∗(a∗) verifies:
ρ((1− τ)ws(a) + (1 + i)(j∗(a∗)(1 + r)− φ)) > φ
1 + r
(31)








ft(bt) g(a) dbtda (32)
• Prob(p/p) gives the probability that agents born to poor parents re-
main poor. For this to happen, there are two possibilities: either the
individual has an ability below a∗ and she will therefore remain poor
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for sure, either she has an ability above a∗ and she will remain poor if












b ft(bt) g(a) dbtda
(33)
3.4 Main results
3.4.1 Impact of the initial distribution of wealth
It is very useful to see the probabilities we just computed as the expected
fractions of population that will be mobile or not. An important result to
draw from these probabilities is that depending on the initial distribution of
wealth as well as on the distribution of abilities, it is more than likely that we
will have multiple possible long-run distributions. Indeed, the distribution
of a around a∗ will be crucial to decide of the extent of the overall investment
in human capital in this economy. Moreover the initial distribution of wealth
will have a huge impact on the way the economy is going to behave insofar
as it will determine how many individuals are locked from the beginning
in the unskilled/poverty trap, that is those who got less than k∗(a∗) in the
very first period. It is then quite straightforward to observe that, if we
consider two economies (same preferences, same technologies, same overall
wealth) that differ only in the distribution of initial wealth, the one with
the smallest variance is more likely to achieve higher levels of human capital
accumulation and thus wealth (although the random abilities might blur
the picture), because less agents are likely to get trapped into unskilled
positions. The important result here lies in that we have a persistent impact
of initial distribution of wealth on the subsequent economic achievements
and that more equality in the initial distribution, helping to overcome the
credit constraint, means higher growth levels.
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3.4.2 Reallocation of resources between educational sectors
In order to address the question presented in introduction on the optimal
allocation of resources among the two sectors, we need to disentangle the two
effects at work previously described: trickle-down and occupational. Let us
come back to what we said in introduction: reallocating resources towards
the advanced education sector increases the returns to advanced education
and thus the incentive to invest in it, on the other hand, it deteriorates the
quality of basic education and therefore worsens the situations of those who
cannot invest, which will impact negatively enrollment in higher education of
the subsequent generation. In turn, the inverse movement, say reallocation
of resources from advanced to basic education, will improve the situation
of the unskilled and then relax the liquidity constraint of their offspring. It
will nevertheless also decrease the incentive to invest in advanced education.
Now that we presented the two ambiguous effects, let us try to see whether
one dominates. To do so with our model, we need to take the derivative of
the ability and wealth thresholds a∗ and k∗(a) with respect to eB, which is
the share of public resources dedicated to basic education. In order for an
analytical solution to appear quite simply, we restrict to the case when α =
β = 1. One can check that there exists a e∗B such that, above (respectively
below) e∗B, a





− 2 + r
2τYt−1
(34)
It means that, unless the share of basic education exceeds e∗B, the occupa-
tional effect dominates so that reallocating from advanced to basic education
lowers the thresholds to access higher education. It will result in a higher
fraction of individuals investing in higher education and thus a higher growth
level. Obviously, the conclusions are opposite if we are above e∗B.
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4 Extensions
In order to speak about possible extensions of this model, one must start
with speaking of its weaknesses. As mentioned already, one of the strongest
assumption for a model in economics of education is the one of the randomly
assigned abilities. Indeed, since very little has been definitively ascertained
as regards the transmission of talents and is still subject of strong disputes,
it seems a natural assumption to consider that the distribution of these
talents is random. However, in order to be precise here, we speak about
talent or ability as a capacity to study efficiently, which is different from the
managerial talent for instance that is often considered as randomly distrib-
uted. Concerning this capacity to study efficiently, no one can deny that
there exists a positive relationship between the level of education and income
of the parents and those of the children. Be it through genetic transmis-
sion, education or early stage educational investment as in Carneiro, Cunha
& Heckman (2004), there exists some ability transmission between parents
and children. It appears then that we should correct the model in order to
integrate these factors in the determination of the ability rather than sim-
ply assuming it is random. For instance, we could take the parental level
of human capital as a proxy for the ability of the children. Thus it would
imply that the ability constraint as well as the liquidity one are determined
by one’s parents instead of being just random. It would allow to become
consistent with the critics that demonstrate that the credit constraint is not
binding as regards college attendance in the US and with the thesis of Heck-
man according to which the credit constraint is not necessarily the crucial
problem, but that it is rather the imperfection on the market for parents4
that creates the inefficiency in the human capital accumulation. It would be
all the more satisfying that it would help to solve one of the main caveats
of our current model that is the lack of long-run stability. Indeed, the fact
that abilities are random makes the mobility process very unstable and it
seems very dubious that it is possible to derive a long-run equilibrium at
4the fact that children cannot buy their parents on a market and cannot even choose
them
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this state. In the case where abilities would depend on the parent’s level
of human capital, we would get much more stability in the behavior of the
dynasties and it might therefore be possible to define some long-run equi-
libria. Moreover, it would very probably be more realistic in the sense that
upward and particularly downward mobility would be much more limited.
Here, a simple accident in the ability of a high-skilled dynasty member can
lock the dynasty in the poverty trap forever. Such a situation would be less
likely to happen in the extended model. We thus believe that it would fit
better observed facts.
5 Conclusion
After having reviewed different strands of the literature about the economics
of education, we have constructed a model based on important features of
the models we described in the review. Like almost all the models in this
literature, we built an overlapping generation framework. Agents are consid-
ered to be altruistic and heterogeneous in initial wealth like in Galor & Zeira
(1993). They are assigned randomly abilities, which must be understood in
the sense of a capacity to study efficiently, as in Loury (1981). Education
is divided into two stages: a basic mandatory one and an advanced one for
which investment is needed, as in Lloyd-Ellis (2000). The decision to invest
or not is subject to a credit constraint that is constructed as in Galor & Zeira
(1993). This framework allowed us to derive that the initial distribution of
wealth does matter and determines the human capital accumulation process
as well as future economic growth. We could as well infer that reallocating
resources from basic to advanced education had two conflicting effects: on
the one hand, it increases returns to higher education and reinforces thus the
incentive to invest, but on the other hand, it deteriorates the quality of basic
education and thus the wage of those who cannot invest in higher education,
which, as a consequence, further worsens the liquidity constraint of the next
generation. These results were already established in Loury (1981), Galor &
Zeira (1993) and Lloyd-Ellis (2000), however not in the same general setup
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